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Energy Jaw is the product of energy politics, and politics can be emot ional and content ious_ At the 
same time, many energy policy disputes turn on questions amenable to sc ientific study- the fight 
over ac id rain in the 1980s, the long-running battle over climate change , and the current fight over 
hydraulic fracturing ("!racking"), to name a few 
We commonly look to academic and government studies to play a constructive role in policy debates 
by adding expertise, and a point of view that is not tethered to a part icular favored outcome_ As 
noncombatants, third party experts ought to be able to act as honest brokers in policy debates; 
however, some common psychological and cu ltural biases can undermine that task. 
In a perfec tly rational world, we wou ld adjust our beliefs about what is true - for example, about the 
magnitude of the risks posed by emissions of greenhouse gases or hydraulic fracturing - as scientific 
study provides us with new information about those risks. Instead, we commonly assimilate new 
information in biased ways, crediting studies that support our positions and disc rediting those that 
don't 
Psychologists attribute this phenomenon to "confirmat ion bias," the notion that peop le are motivated 
to defend and protect cherished beliefs, and so will assimilate and interpret new information in ways 
that protec t those beliefs. Psycholog ist Raymond Nickerson describes th is process as a kind of 
unconscious analog to the process trial lawyers go through when bu ilding a case - a kind of 
"unwitting selectivity in the acquisition and use of evidence." 
Cu ltural anthropologists, for their part, offer a slight ly different explanation of our biased assimi lation 
of new information. They point to our prior "cu ltural commitments ," which they say shape our beliefs 
about what is true. We are each psychologically committed to our own soc ial identity , which in turn is 
tied to our group memberships, our ideology, etc. These commitments prevent the rational 
processing of information on public policy matters. We re ly on experts, but we on ly trust those 
experts who "share our values"; and we assess whether an expert shares our values based, in part, 
on the content of the expert's opinion . This is a phenomenon that Dan Kahan and his colleagues at 
the Yale Law School's Cultura l Cognition Project call the "cultural cognition of risk." 
Thus, for example, a dwindling number of climate change skeptics work to discredit climate sc ience, 
despite the clear scientific consensus that human activity drives climate change. These skeptics 
inc lude not only those with an economic incentive to oppose cl imate sc ience (such as members of the 
energy industry, for whom confi rmation bias may be at work), but also many ideological conservatives 
with no such incentive (whose cu ltural identity may be driving their skeptic ism)_ 
Similarly, opponents of !racking confidently assert that it "inevitably" leads to drinking water 
contamination, despite the accumulating academic studies ind icating that contamination is likely very 
rare . Indeed, it is not uncommon to see proponents and opponents of tracking cite the very same 
anecdotes and studies in support of their claims about fracking 's risks. 
This problem of a biased assimilation may be exacerbated by "framing effects." We create 
taxonomies - mental stories - into which we fit new information, including new information about 
climate change or tracking . These taxonomies include heroes and villa ins , imbu ing our mental stories 
with a moral component 
It is easy to see how this kind of framing might inftuence our assimilat ion of new information about 
climate change or shale gas production There is a long history of framing politica l conftict over 
energy policy as "energy versus the environment," "people versus profits," and "fossil fuels versus 
clean energy." Often , these kinds of associations are not conscious choices; to the contrary, they are 
a function of how the human brain stores (and reca lls) information . Having heard or read news 
stories about the Exxon Valdez accident and the Deepwater Horizon spill, the brain may develop 
neural connections between the parts of the brain that store information about oil and gas compan ies 
and the parts of the brain that store information about poll ution _ 
Thus, when proponents of shale gas production tout the relative environmental benefits of clean 
inexpensive natural gas, they are running headlong into these fram ing effects. The environmenta l 
battles of the past often pitted the forces of environmentalism against the "fossil fuels" industry, 
creating assoc iations in our minds between coal , oil and gas that impede the efforts of fracking's 
proponents to draw environmental distinct ions between those fue ls. 
All of wh ich puts elected politicians in a difficult position . On the one hand, they are accountable to 
voters for their jobs, not to sc ience; on the other, they may suspect that sc ientific truths will win out in 
the end , and that they pander to unsupported popu lar beliefs at the ir own risk . We may already be 
seeing the sc ientific consensus over climate change slowly finding its way into public opinion, if recent 
public opin ion pol ls are any indication. 
But the dialogue between experts and the public over !racking is not nearly as far along . Politicians 
facing strong public pressures over !racking, such as Governor Cuomo of New York, ought to do their 
best to avoid succumbing to confirmation bias or the cu ltural cognition of risk by (i) recogniz ing that 
the sc ientific debate over tracking is much more circumspect and careful than the public debate, (ii) 
delegat ing to techn ical experts the task of developing the factual basis of any policy decision, and (iii) 
avoiding staking out a position on the risks of tracking in front of constituent groups prior to rev iewing 
the sc ientif ic evidence. 
In the midst of energy policy debates that emit more heat than light, it can be difficu lt for policymakers 
to muster the will to base their decisions on good science and a broad view of relative risks . 
Recogn izing the biases at work in the pub lic deoate can help policymakers insu late themselves from 
those biases, and make better policy decisions_ 
# energy # !racking 
Leave a Reply 
Your ema il address will not be published Required fields are marked • 
Name * 




The KBH Energy Center 
blog is a forum for faculty 
at Tl1e University of 
Texas at Austin, leading 
practitioners, lawmakers 
and otl1er experts to 
contribute to tile 
discussion of vital law 
and policy debates in the 
areas of energy, 
environmental law, and 
international arbitration. 
Blog posts reflect t/1e 
opinions of t11e aut11ors 
and not of Tl1e University 
of Texas at Austin or tile 
KBH Energy Center. 






endangered species (12) 
natural gas (11 ) 
groundwater (8) 
climate change (7) 
court cases (6) 




Clean Air Act (5) 
